1935, however, William Firth Wells, an engineer at Harvard, began to challenge this dogma3 and argued that certain diseases, such as measles, were spread through the air by droplet nuclei. Ultraviolet (UV) lights were introduced into a few schools to test this hypothesis and, initially at least, met with success. As recently as 1946, however, a committee of the American Public Health Association, in its final report, wrote: "Conclusive evidence is not available at present that the airborne mode of transmission of infection is predominant for any particular disease."4 Among the committee members was Dr. Alexander Langmuir, who later was converted.
The next 25 years, of course, sharply changed beliefs about airborne transmission of infectious disease and put epidemiological theory on a more scientific basis. Langmuir, in a thoughtful review published in 1980,3 identified four areas of study that led to a more substantive understanding of the role of airborne infection. These were, first, an understanding of the creation and behavior of aerosols of microorganisms; second, an understanding of the physiology and function of the respiratory tract, particularly the respiratory host defense mechanisms; third, the study of experimental airborne infections in animals and humans; and fourth, increased understanding of the epidemiology of both naturally occurring and accidentally acquired infection.
Knowledge and understanding of the role of airborne infection in the healthcare setting has paralleled understanding of the role of airborne infection more generally. In fact, it probably is fair to state that studies of nosocomial infection transmission often have been pivotal in understanding the broad role of airborne infection. The classic studies of Richard Riley in the Baltimore Veterans Administration Hospital,5'6 for example, were of landmark significance, finally convincing even the skeptics that TB was, for the most part, an airborne infection. These studies were elegant in the simplicity of their design (Figure 1 ). Room air was exhausted from pilot ward rooms, in which were patients with pulmonary TB; exhaust air then was circulated to test chambers in which were housed guinea pigs, highly susceptible to infection by any tubercle bacilli that might be in their inspired air. The effect of UV light could be assessed simultaneously in a parallel series of exposure chambers. 
SOURCES OF AIRBORNE INFECTION IN HOSPITALS
Possible sources of airborne nosocomial infection are summarized in Table 1 . Within the hospital, the most important and most obvious sources are human beings: patients, personnel, or visitors. To be an efficient source of airborne infection, a person needs to be a disseminator, or spreader, of some pathogenic organism. Such a disseminator may be a person with symptomatic disease, as has been described in nosocomial outbreaks of TB and smallpox; alternatively, a disseminator may be wholly asymptomatic, a kind of microbial "Pigpen," to recall the Peanuts character. Such asymptomatic carriers have been well described as sources of airborne nosocomial staphylococcal infections. Sites from which airborne dissemination has occurred include the nares, pharynx, anus, skin, and skin scales. Other possible sources of airborne infection within the hospital include dusts or aerosols from the floor or furniture, from potted plants or flower vases, sinks, showers, nebulizers, humidifiers, or aspirating devices. Contaminated ventilation or air-conditioning systems have been implicated in some nosocomial airborne outbreaks, via infective aerosols, dust, or even colonized filters. '7 Outside the hospital, there are a number of possible inanimate sources as well. These must include soils, acting as a natural habitat of certain pathogens, or soil that has been contaminated by feces. Water supplies may be contaminated by potential pathogens and the contaminants then may be amplified in certain settings such as cooling towers or in holding areas within the hospital. Legionnaire's disease has been spread both from contaminated cooling tower water and by the generation of infective aerosols from water supplies within the hospital. Infective dusts may be generated from building construction or renovation activities within the hospital or located in immediately adjacent areas. A substantial number of viruses, bacteria, and fungi are capable of spreading via the airborne route in hospitals. Possibility of airborne transmission and documentation of airborne transmission are quite different, however, and the problem is complicated by the fact that many if not most of the pathogens to be discussed are capable of spreading by more than one route. Many common respiratory viral infections, for example, may be spread by large droplets, actually a form of indirect contact, and by airborne droplet nuclei. This discussion will focus on pathogens for which there is good evidence of at least some airborne transmission.
Viruses believed to be spread at least in part by the airborne route in hospitals are shown in Table 2 . The common respiratory viruses, including rhinoviruses, influenza and parainfluenza viruses, respiratory syncytial virus, and adenoviruses are included in this category. The evidence in support of airborne rather than droplet spread of many of these viruses often is incomplete; however, there is good epidemiological evidence for airborne transmission of respiratory syncytial virus and adenoviruses in pediatric wards.&l0 The strongest epidemiological evidence of airborne transmission of influenza comes not from the hospital setting, but rather from a well-documented outbreak that occurred on a commercial aircraft.1' Bacteria that have been implicated in airborne transmission in healthcare facilities are shown in Table 3 . Evidence in support of airborne transmission of bacteria generally is easier to obtain than in the case of viruses simply because it is technically easier to recover bacteria using air sampling techniques. Yet the mere demonstration of viable bacterial pathogens in the air does not establish that airborne transmission has occurred.
Bacteria that may be transmitted airborne directly from infected persons or healthy carriers include group A streptococci, Staphylococcus aureus, the Menin- trated in Figure 4 . Carrier infants were placed in the "X" bassinets; the same nurses that cared for the "X" infants also cared for the 'T" infants, and spread of the index staphylococci to the 'T" infants probably was primarily a result of contact spread. That this was so could be demonstrated by a sharp reduction in colonization of the 'T" infants when rigorous handwashing techniques were used. The "AB" infants, however, were cared for by other nurses who were restricted to the area in the nursery bounded by the solid line shown in Figure 4 . Thus, these nurses had no contact with the "X" or "T" infants, and the spread of index staphylococci to the "AB" infants was primarily airborne. In recent decades, however, staphylococcal cross-infection in nurseries appears to have become much less prominent, although staphylococcal colonization almost surely continues to occur. In contrast, staphylococcal postoperative wound infections remain a significant problem, particularly in procedures involving the insertion of prosthetic devices, including joints and valves. There continues to be a great deal of controversy, however, as to the relative contribution to the problem made by airborne transmission of staphylococci, as compared with transmission by direct or indirect contact. For example, when total hip arthroplasty first was introduced, postoperative infections, mostly due to staphylococci, were unacceptably frequent. Using ultraclean vertical laminar airflow plus exhaust-ventilated clothing in the operating room, Charnley et a123 were able to show in the late 1960s a striking reduction in postoperative sepsis rates from 9% to 1%. Critics pointed out that there were no concurrent controls in those studies and that several other changes were introduced during the study period. Surgeons improved their skills as they gained more experience, operative techniques were changed, and operation duration decreased.14 Furthermore, in some other centers, notably at the Mayo Clinic, where ultraclean air was not used for total hip arthroplasties, infection rates were comparably low. 24 The role of airborne bacteria in operating rooms as major determinants of postoperative wound infection rates in other kinds of surgical procedures remains controversial as well. Some surgeons in the United States, notably Deryl Hart at Duke University, were so convinced of the significant role of airborne transmission that they installed UV lights in their operating rooms during the 1940s and 1950s.25 Published data suggested that the use of UV lights in those operating rooms was associated with a very low infection rate, approximately 0.5% in "refined clean wounds," a category of surgical wounds in which one would expect an infection rate of 1% or less. 26 Continuing In one instance, a healthcare worker with HIV infection and TB was the index case in a major outbreak in a city hospital.34 Even before the AIDS epidemic, there already was abundant evidence that TB was transmitted via the air in hospitals.35 TB is in many ways the prototype airborne infection because there is evidence that tubercle bacilli are transmitted more effectively by the airborne route than by any other. Droplet nuclei, owing to their very small size, may be inhaled directly into terminal alveoli without even encountering the pulmonary host defense mechanisms that protect us so well against larger particles. Group A streptococcal airborne transmission in hospitals fortunately is infrequent, but has occurred. The source almost invariably has been a physician or nurse, and spread has been from the nares, pharynx, vagina, or anus.36 Meningococcal nosocomial infection has been rare, but probably has occurred as well. 37 In general, enteric gram-negative bacteria are spread only rarely, if at all, via the air because they are quite susceptible to drying. However, other nonenteric gram-negative organisms, includingPseudomonas and Acinetobacter, have been transmitted through the air. Allen and Green38 reported an outbreak of mul- tidrug-resistant Acinetobacter anitratus infections in patients in neurosurgical wards and the intensive care unit of a general hospital. Most of the infections involved the respiratory tracts of ventilated patients, but the respiratory equipment could not be implicated as the source of the outbreak. The investigators believed that airborne transmission played a major role in perpetuation of this outbreak, but the proportion of infection caused by airborne spread could not be determined. It is worth noting, however, that this particular organism has been found to be unique among gram-negative bacilli in its relative resistance to drying. 39 In the past two decades, Legionella pneumophila and related species have emerged as significant nosocomial pathogens that may be spread via air. In a thoughtful review, Ayliffes50 cited an unpublished study carried out in Birmingham, England, in which the postoperative wound infection rate in an unventilated operating suite during the year preceding installation of a ventilation system was 8.8%; in the year following installation of a plenum ventilation system with 20 air changes per hour, the infection rate was 12.6%! Furthermore, there was a 50% reduction in airborne bacterial counts after the ventilation system was installed in this admittedly uncontrolled study. He cited evidence that most wound infections are acquired in the operating room from the patient's own microbial flora, the balance being acquired mainly from staff present in the operating room during surgery. Since air is an important source of infection involving insertion of prostheses of various kinds, the use of ultraclean air and exhaust-ventilated clothing frequently is recommended. The value of this technology in other kinds of surgical procedures, however, is doubtful.
It appears likely today that Brachman was not far off in his 1970 estimate,48 and a more recent estimate of the relative incidence of airborne infections is about 10% of the whole of endemic nosocomial infection. 7 Epidemic nosocomial infections must be considered, as well. The CDC studies carried out during the early 1970s suggested that outbreaks of nosocomial infection in seven hospitals participating in an intensive surveillance study represented only about 2% of all patients with nosocomial infection. 51 Wenzel et a152 estimated that outbreaks accounted for 3.7% of nosocomial infections in a large university tertiary care referral center. Among nosocomial outbreaks investigated by the CDC from 1986 to 1990, more than 67%0 were related to products, procedures, or devices.53 Thus, airborne outbreaks of nosocomial infection have not been prominent, at least on a simple statistical basis.
Although reassuring, there have been some disquieting trends in the last decade. Particularly worrisome has been the resurgence of airborne nosocomial transmission ofTB, a problem made all the more urgent by the multidrug-resistant nature of recent outbreaks. Outbreaks of airborne legionellosis in hospitals continue to occur, as does airborne transmission ofAspergillus causing both endemic disease in certain special care units and construction-related outbreaks. These concerns relate primarily to outbreaks, unanticipated and unpredictable in occurrence. The only predictable thing about epidemic nosocomial infections is that they will continue to occur.
Should we be doing surveillance cultures for airborne nosocomial pathogens? Our surgical colleagues would love us if we did! In 1970, at the behest of the American Hospital Association Advisory Committee on Infections in Hospitals, I published recommendations against routine environmental sampling programs, including air sampling, even with simple techniques such as settle plates.54 At that time, patientbased surveillance programs literally were just getting started in a few hospitals, and environmental sampling programs were, in fact, what most hospitals were doing to "prevent" nosocomial infection. It mattered not that no one knew how to interpret the data generated by such programs.
Did we overstate the case against environmental sampling? Not at all, in view of the circumstances that existed at that time. Should this policy be reexamined? I believe the answer is yes; in some very limited circumstances, it may be appropriate to reconsider directed environmental sampling in ultrahighrisk units such as bone marrow transplant units or other settings in which patients temporarily have no functioning host defense mechanisms. In such settings, any stray opportunistic organism that comes along may in fact cause a fatal infection. At the very least, the issue certainly merits some thoughtful consideration.
